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INTRODUCTION 
The governmental statement in response to September 2008's disaster of Al-douwekah, that disaster which 
tragically resulted in the death of two hundred and fifty two people and severe injury of five hundred and ten others 
(Alahram, 2008), reflects the ironic dilemma of Egypt's spatial system deformity. The statement referred to soil 
saturation with sewer drainage water - in the absence of a sewer network - as the reason why the giant boulders at 
the top of the middle hill ofAlmokatam mountain, located to the east of old Cairo, split off and avalanched down 
on hundreds of squatter houses below packed full with rural migrants and urban poor. The statement not only held 
the casualties responsible for their disastrous loss - referring to their illegal squatting - but blamed them for 
migrating originally from their villages to Cairo. This attitude reflects a long history of government policy pattern 
in approaching spatial disparity among other imbalances of the entire spatial system. Currently, almost seventy 
percent of Cairo's population of 17 million live in informal settlements within the old city center and on the peri 
urban regions in miserable conditions similar to those of Al-douwekah (CAPMAS, 2007). Nonetheless, the 
number of squatters is growing and their living conditions constantly worsen. As squatters are poor and powerless, 
they are likely to sustain their condition of misery and marginalization for an unforeseeable future. 
However, the initial concern of the government officials and policy makers has not been how to upgrade the 
substandard livelihood of the poor population majority, as much as how to lessen or, optimistically, reverse 
their immense inflow to primate urban cores. Unfortunately, even this objective, hoped to be achieved through 
an aggressively adopted urban policy and tools, is yet out of reach (El-Shakhs, 1971, 1992, 1994). On the contrary, 
urban growth which develops in core regions at higher rates than those in secondary urban agglomerations is 
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additionally intensified by inadequate development decisions which have led to a widening spatial disparity gap 
between rural regions, primacies, and secondary urban agglomerations (El-Shakhs, 1982). Alleviating the built up 
social tension and frustration generated by expandable spatial disparity, along with the effects of the problems 
associated with overgrowth of congested urban cores has became the major concern of the successive state 
governments but wears out their limited financial and managerial capacities, and certainly impedes a steady 
achievement of the state's long-term development objectives. 
A review of the Egyptian development policy paradigm over the last three decades reveals the adoption of a 
new spatial development option which endorses the construction of new cities and satellite settlements in 
proximity to traditional urban cores and major cities. This policy pattern was later overlapped by the construction of 
mega industrial/agricultural projects and their required residential complexes on desert hinterlands far from the 
traditionally inhabited urban and rural regions of the Nile valley and Delta. The new policy trend replaced a fuzzy 
form of unsystematic development which focused on the reclamation of nearby desert lands and the 
construction of industrial centers in proximity to major urban cores. New policy has been marketed on the 
social level as imperative to effectively decelerating excessive urbanization in two congested primacies, 
Cairo and Alexandria, with a secondary objective of balancing the national spatial disparity. Although such 
a development option, which is as politically encoded as it is controversial, is forcefully advocated and 
adopted by the formal state institutions, indicators of management of the Egyptian spatial system's distortions 
remain humble and occasionally disappointing, even for the declared purpose of mitigating the intensity of over-
urbanization phenomenon. 
This essay investigates the multiple causes pertaining to the imbalances of the Egyptian spatial system 
and the capacity of the new development policy trend to rectify the spatial system deformities. It argues that the 
current policy approach, frequently resulting in greater dominance of urban cores which continue to gain influence 
and accumulate wealth and contribute, consequently, to the intensification of urban-rural disparity and spatial system 
deformation. The research is sectioned into two parts: the first part discusses the major characteristics and 
forms of spatial system deformity. The second part evaluates the consistency and efficiency of the current 
spatial development policy. Policy evaluation adopted a bilateral approach of comparing policy development 
paradigm to the Event-Based Public Development model postulated by Gore & Nicholson (1985) in addition to 
examining data extracted from three consecutive statistic census results. For the purpose of convenience, Toushki mega 
project was selected for evaluation as a model of the new development policy trend. 
SPATIAL SYSTEM AND URBANIZATION PATTERN  
Overview 
Egypt, while undergoing a stage of economic and social transition, has found that its spatial system is under the 
influence of unstable agglomeration forces and economies-and-diseconomies that constantly change its spatial 
interface. There are also three apparent characteristics which have influenced Egypt's spatial system: a) the 
extensive spatial disparity between the northern and the southern parts of the country; b) the acute unequal 
population dispersion which is evidenced in population count imbalances between the Nile Valley and Delta, and 
the country's remaining regions, and in the non-hierarchical city-rank structure of the entire country which display 
the dominance of the two primacies in terms of allocation of investments and possession of social services; and c) 
the untamed urbanization growth and population polarization to major urban cores. 
Geographically, two natural factors contribute to the imbalances of the spatial system. The river Nile, 
Egypt's major source of water, flows to the Mediterranean through the narrow valley of which the maximum width 
is 12 km for about 1200 km, forming Egypt's fertile Delta with a 250 km width. (GOPP, 1991). As agricultural has 
been Egypt's major economic activity- practically all agricultural activities take place in some 25000 km2 (6 million 
acres) - most cities, and rural areas as well, except for a few of first- nature locations such as Alexandria and 
Suez Canal cities, were forged along the Nile valley and Delta, leaving vast areas of the country desolate. Due to 
the scarcity of the manageable water compared to Egypt's area and its speedily grown population, Egypt has built the 
High Dam on the Nile stream as part of its water security strategy to better manage its limited water share. 
However, this didn't contribute to rectifying the spatial pattern. Egypt's climatic nature, the second natural factor, 
has contributed also to spatial system imbalances. Aridity has confined arable land to the banks of the Nile leaving 
no chance for outward expansion. Additionally, the extremely hot temperature of the southern deserts has expelled the 
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population who chose to migrate to the richer and cooler northern regions, leading to more unbalanced 
population dispersal and economic disintegration. 
Along with natural factors come the political economy dimensions which influence the country's spatial 
nature and determine the trends of development policy. Throughout the recent history of Egypt, the political 
economy dimensions have competed in conservative-radical terms, in state-led versus market-led terms, and 
in trade restrictions (import substitution) versus open trade (export-led growth) terms. Three major periods have 
had distinguishing different political economic ideologies interrelated to the state's spatial characteristics. 
During Mohamed Ali's rule (1805-1848), he realized how he should relocate Egypt's resources to bridge the wide 
development gap between Egypt and the modern West, and he allocated significant investments for developing 
agriculture which contributed positively to the state's economic progress. Nevertheless, his "modernization" policy 
focused on impersonating Western lifestyles and occidental city planning and urban development models. Both 
trends failed to improve the livelihoods of the majority poor peasants who lived outside glittering look-alike Western 
cities where only landlords and technocrats reaped the fruits of the resulted economic progress. Mohamed Ali's successors 
followed his same steps in all but a few details. However, population distribution and the rate of urban growth 
did not represent a real concern to the system at that time. Throughout the colonial period, in which a pattern of urban 
development policy was gradually articulated, investments were directed towards the establishment of projects 
around major cities, where the colonial marshal's headquarters were located1. Cities along the Suez Canal 
also had some of the development investments seized, as they signified strategic locations along the Suez 
Canal which represents a major source of revenue. The Egyptian nationalization period (1952-1974), started with 
the 23rd of July coup d'etat but witnessed different developmental policies. At the beginning, a new trend surfaced which 
endeavored to turn Egypt into an industrial country-which was seen as the magic key to modernization and 
development- at the expense of agriculture development. Many industrial projects were established around 
Alexandria, Helwan and Shoubra Al Khima to the south and to the north of Cairo, Al Mahala Al Kobra in central Delta, 
Nagaa Hamady in middle Upper Egypt, and in other spots close to major urban centers which attracted many peasants 
for better paid industrial jobs. This pattern of public investment formed spatial concentrations to the north around 
core areas which was the norm until recently, despite meager attempts to distribute investments outside traditional 
urban centers in the last two decades. These socio-political timeframes have shared a sluggish, inconsistent, or a 
false paradigm of development, lacked a concrete vision for development, and failed to foresee the future implications 
of their development policies on the integrity of the national spatial system. 
Urban Overgrowth and Polarization to Primacies 
Since the beginning of massive and continual rural to urban migration that followed post-World War II, urban 
growth rates have averaged about one percentage point higher than the rates for rural areas (CAPMAS, 2007). 
Generally, Egyptian cities and villages have grown at a fast pace, surpassing 800% of their original footprint in 
1985 in some areas in 2006 (The World Bank, 2008). The urban population has also been expanding at the rate of 
4 percent annually for more than forty years (CAPMAS, 1997). The poor and deprived population in rural areas 
are constantly pushed to migrate to wealthier cities where they can have access to employment opportunities, better 
education, and improved health care services. On the other hand, concentration of economic activities operating in 
and around the two metropolitan agglomerations pulls more migrants and qualifies these two metropolitans to be 
among the biggest urban concentrations in Africa and the Middle East (Ibrahim, 1987). 
Rapid urbanization in major cities, while leads to a higher rate of economic development due to the 
improved integration of different economic sectors, expands regional disparity, and consequently promotes urban 
polarization (Richardson, 1989; El-Shakes, 1971; Alonza, 1971; Shishido & Wheaton, 1981; De-Cola, 1994). 
Urban polarization, which has been at its peak from the mid 1970s, induces different patterns of urban growth. 
The dissimilarity of growth patterns and rates between primacies and the remaining cities is so significant 
that Cairo, for instance, has been luring both rural and urban migrants with continually high and incremental 
rate of urban primacy (UNDP, 2006) ii. The phenomenon is also evident for Alexandria, where primacy rate reached 
2.98 % in 1996 (CAPMAS, 1997). These high urban primacy indexes suggest variation to the primacy pattern 
of Western countries in their early stages of development. As for developing countries, the lack of financial resources 
and incapacity to develop transportation and communication networks often direct urban growth towards 
wealthier, better connected regions, with no expected pattern change. In many instances, nevertheless, governments 
were eager to reverse the polarization pattern to the degree that they initiated industrial/urban growth poles 
to compete with urban core regions in luring migration flows. Venezuela (Friedmann, 1969), Tanzania 
(Sawers, 1989), South Africa (Dewar, Todes, and Watson, 1986), Thailand (Sternstein, 1979), Egypt (Stewart, 
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1996), Mexico (Barkin, 1975), and Peru (Jameson, 1979), each had one or several of these growth poles, most of 
which stumbled because they failed to attract the quantity or quality of migrants intended. 
The introduction of push and pull factors by Lee (1966) has contributed to the interpretation of the migratory 
influencing forces that have been driving migration flows since the 1950s in developing countries. Along with other 
factors, rural poverty has pushed migrants out while higher incomes and social amenities associated with the 
primate cities have lured them in. However, there is some evidence that urban primacy decline did begin prior to 
1980 in some developing countries although government programs that targeted urban primacy were indecisive (Wong, 
2006). Vining (1986) found that five advanced developing countries, Greece, Ireland, Spain, Argentina, and Venezuela, 
experienced a significant decline in rate of net migration to the core region in the 1970s, while further evidence 
from MacKellar and Vining (1995) revealed that negative net migration to the core was observed in Mexico, Cuba, 
Brazil, and Venezuela. Villa and Rodriquez (1996) found that 12 of the 14 largest primate cities in Latin America 
had experienced a decline in the level of primacy between 1970 and 1980. 
Building on the assumption postulated by Mehta (1964), Wheaton and Shishido (1981), and El-Shakhs 
(1971) that correlates the initiation of urban polarization reversal to the country's progress through economic 
development, polarization decline and/or reversal initiation, is likely to take considerable time considering the 
sluggish and fluctuating rate of economic development and the inequitable means by which development 
revenues are distributed in the community groups. (El-Shakhs 1971, 1992, 1994; Yousry & Aboulatta, 2002). The 
concept of relating the decline in urban polarization pace to the transition of the country to the next phase of economic 
development is consistent with Egypt's inability to sensibly develop its economy in the last 30 years and to 
distribute development revenues fairly among the population. The growth in GDP per capita,"1 has been wiped out by 
the vast income inequality between the rich and the poor. In contrast with the government allegations, the fruits of 
development have not been absorbed by the high pace of population growth, but mainly channeled to a minor group 
of tycoons who accumulated more wealth and seized more political power (Ragab, 2007). 
This explanation of urban polarization forces and dynamics in Egypt acquires more creditability than the one 
proposed by literature, which ignores the interrelation of urban polarization intensity and the stage of economic 
development. These differences raise doubts of success in imposing some Western models of urban development on 
developing countries. Additional factors are the weak and inconsistent approaches and methodologies of the applied 
development plans, and the historical influence of colonial policies on the pattern of spatial system, which were not 
experienced in Western countries within their transition period. 
High demand for housing and urban land due to over urbanization has produced an extensive form of informal 
housing in all Egyptian cities. In 2006, informal settlements represented almost 40% of Egypt's total urban 
population, accounting for 16.7 million inhabitants living in about 8.9 million housing units (CAPMAS, 2007). The 
majority of these settlements encroached illegally on agricultural land. While formal settlements have access to education 
and health services as well as to clean water and sanitation, many of the informal settlements, slum pockets that grew 
in the old urban fabric in particular, suffer from a high unemployment rate, safety problems, domestic violence, and the 
lack of all basic services and amenities. 
On the other hand, the impact of over urbanization is additionally intensified by the institutional weakness of 
land management bodies at all levels of administration. These institutions neither provided urban land for 
development in terms of managing planning plots, securing legal tenures, and constructing basic infrastructures-and-
services, nor implemented procedural, transactional, and operational urban jobs. The institutional vulnerability hampered 
government's capacity to keep pace with the incremental magnitude of over urbanization-related problems or to 
sustain minimum standards of urban job performance. Nevertheless, the imperative need for expanding institutional 
capacities to efficiently manage massive and incremental demand for land and services, later gained priority on the 
authority's agenda. The results, consequently, are indicators that are linked, partially or totally, to management 
incapacity: the proliferation of illegal housing settlements and accompanying substandard living conditions, the 
unjustifiable overspending, the insignificant cost recovery and cost effectiveness of development activities, and the 
poor exploitation of the limited available resources. 
City rank and population density-development rank 
Beside the high primacy indexes of Cairo and Alexandria that have been mentioned earlier, there are substantial 
imbalances in the city rank system and in interrelated population densities in almost every city. Many have much 
less population than others at the same rank size, and all experience, except for some newly established cities, 
imbalances in population densities all over their districts. For instance, the city of 6th of October comprises 1.1 
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million inhabitants while Borg Alarab city comprises .221 million inhabitants although they both have the same 
rank. As for population density, the Hai (neighborhood) of Albasateen and Dar Elsalam of Cairo had 719,800 
inhabitants in 2007 whereas hai Almusky, also in Cairo, had only 30,800 inhabitants although they have the same 
area, displaying unbalanced urban hierarchy (CAMPAS, 2007). 
Analysis of the current pattern of demographic indicators based on the administrative skeletonlv shows the 
acquisition of governorate capitals on the highest human development rank, separated by a considerable 
distance from the remaining of their marakez and cities/ This Prime City Effect phenomenon is caused by the 
concentration of economic, social, and service activities in those cities resulting in greater progress and 
development in the prime city than in the remaining governorate cities. Also, there is a wide spectrum of 
densities within the administrative boundaries of each governorate (CAPMAS, 2007). 
Urban/Development Policy 
Development can be pursued under the pressure of solving persisting problems or simply by the human need for 
sustainable improvement of livelihood. This pressure has been built-up by economic, political, and demographic 
factors. The substandard conditions and escalating lack in housing commodity, population concentration and 
associated problems of overgrowth have put pressure on urban development. Additionally, the agricultural food 
consumption- production gap and the high rate of unemployment, which necessitates the generation of more labor 
intensive jobs, create development pressure for agricultural expansion and agriculture based industrial 
establishments. In most developing countries, where the state central government undertakes the major 
responsibility of development decisions, it chooses to respond or not to respond to the development pressure and 
decides upon what policy type and tools it should adopt. 
Egypt's development policies within the last four decades have been many and varied, taking contrasting 
positions, and having varied results. Like many of the prevailing policies in developing countries in the 1960s 
and 1970s, development decisions were frequently biased to favor urban development, with consequent disadvantages 
to farmers and rural communities. These urban biased policies contained a sub-theory of economic development and 
an explanation for retarded growth and poverty. Starting from 1974 after the signage of the peace treaty with Israel, 
multi-lateral aid agencies such as the World Bank, and some bilateral agencies started to aid Egypt's plans of 
development through mid-and long terms loans and grants but reacted to the notions of urban bias and urban 
overdevelopment. Bilateral agencies sometimes responded in a counter 'urban bias' way, providing funding and 
technical assistance to agriculture and rural development. In contrast to bilateral agencies, the World Bank became 
increasingly active in urban loan programs but was also circumspect regarding Egypt's import substitution and 
protectionist economic policies. The World Bank had commenced urban and housing loan programs in 1976, but 
it was not until 1988 that many bilateral agencies took a more positive attitude to urbanization (Harris, 1992). 
The changed attitude to urbanization reflected a growing realization that accelerated economic development was 
linked to urban economic development; the volume of urban poverty would exceed rural poverty in the early 
21 st century, and urban environmental conditions would add urban policy significance. 
The state's urban-biased policy which was interpreted in the pattern of capital investment concentration 
in and around primacies and major urban agglomerations could be linked to two factors: the political pressure 
practiced on decision- makers by wealthy elites and technocrats, and the tendency of the ruling regime to favor this 
influential community group who came into the political arena by the new market- led economy, privatization 
policy, and the powerful economic role granted to the private sector during Al-Sadat's ruling period (1970-
1981). Along with these two factors comes the fact that social benefits and services in cities could be achieved 
with a lower cost than the cost needed in rural areas and accordingly, the government is tempted by the ease 
with which to gain faster and cheaper social support and momentum for regime continuity by those who live 
in urban cores in return for its biased urban policy. The data are sparse and not always reliable, but access to 
services and employment opportunities is often stronger in major cities than in secondary cities and rural 
areas. These benefits, however, do not extend to the poorest groups within the city limits who usually resort 
to the informal and illegal measures of survival like those of Al-douwekah slum settlement. 
Generally, the national development policy has been based, more or less, on "tackling the most persistent 
problem" strategy rather than on long term strategic planning. The state capacity to formulate development 
objectives, national urban policy, and structuring a mechanism for policy assessment and readjustment has 
encountered the state government's lack of commitment towards development which is strongly interrelated to the 
type of ruling regime. The jurisdictional powers granted to actors of the eve" ctional authority, the nature of the decision-
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making mechanism, and the balance of powers acquired by different community groups all affect the state's capacity 
to sustain efficient spatial development (Brown, 1991; Goldstein, 1993; Stewart, 1996). Democratic regimes 
tend to arrange local and national priorities, including developmental objectives and policy, according to the best 
interest of all different community groups aiming at filling the community needs gap and achieving social equity. In 
contrast, non-democratic regimes, such as those of Egypt and many developing countries, may tend to protect 
their regimes' dominance or patronize privileged community groups by taking biased or indecisive development 
decisions in spite of their infeasibility, inconsistency or their detrimental implications on the accomplishment 
of development objectives. In the latter political regime class, multiple community actors' roles are abridged to be 
played only by the head of state and a few top officials. Hence, criticism or attempts to delineate alternative courses of 
policy action by community members who are outside the decision makers' inner circle, will be deemed as unaccepted 
opposition. Consequently, policy monitoring, reassessment, and readjustment are either diminished or 
overlooked which definitely increases the chances of policy failure. 
Mega projects program 
Since the mid 90s, a new development policy trend has protracted investment priorities with macroeconomic 
development. However, the unfettered role of market processes has produced a vast, but widely chaotic, pattern of 
urban development. The development policy depended on the establishment of mega agricultural-industrial 
projects in desolate and scattered locations. Projects are categorized geographically into two groups. The first is 
located to the south of the country and comprises projects: "Toshki"vl, "East of Awaynate", "Darb Alarbaeen"," 
Assyout Valley", "Abou Tartour", "Aswan ironing complex", and "Nasser lake Development". The second is 
located to the north east of the Delta basin and comprises projects: "West Suez Gulf, "Shark Al Tafreea", 
"Technology Valley", and "Alsalam Canal". 
With an absence of sound transportation systems linking these projects to older urban centers, they 
provoked considerable doubts about their feasibility. The State incubation of project-model development was 
meant to encourage private local and foreign investments to contribute to the national development process which 
could expand to lagging regions and lessen the burden on the state resources. Projects were assumed to generate 
strong pulling forces, building on a migration gravity model, by providing job opportunities that were 
attractive enough to switch the migrants' traditional destination preferences. It was also predicted that 
inhabitants would gradually create market demand for services and other commodities that would, in turn, 
form economic agglomerations and generate more jobs which would attract other migrants and the process would 
then become self- sustained. 
DOES THE CURRENT URBAN DEVELOPMENT POLICY PAY-
OFF? POLICY ASSESSMENT 
Methods of policy assessment vary considerably. However, some scholars, Kaplow and Shavell (2004) for 
example, claim that any method of assessment that is not purely welfarist violates the Pareto principle (Stewart, 
1996). Kaplow and Shavell use the term "welfarism" to describe notions of social welfare "under which assessment 
of policies depends exclusively on their effects on individuals' utilities" (Kaplow & Shavell, 2004). Building on 
this notion, observing divergence, or consistency in interrelated system patterns, demographic indicators and trends 
in particular, can construct a viable evaluation for the development policy capacity to accomplish short, medium, 
and long term objectives (Wong, 2006). 
However, observing system pattern in Egypt's case is somehow questionable as doubts of data accuracy 
is often surfaced. Census data carried out at in 1986, 1996, and 2006 are used to detect divergences and 
consistencies in demographic and spatial patterns as indicators for policy efficiency. The revision of the 2006 
census data and a comparison with previous census data of 1996 and 1986 reveals some important facts. First, 
numbers of population growth continued to display escalation in primacies; Population in the governorates 
comprises primacies which witnessed an increase in the ten year period (1996-2006): Alexandria 23.09 % (from 
3339076 in 1996 to 4110015 in 2006) and Cairo and Gi/a 22.9 % (from 12836306 in 1996 to 16889877 in 2006). 
Second, the population density average continued also to be recorded as high as 26,000 people per square 
kilometer in Cairo and in some of the more crowded quarters of the city such as Rowd al Farag as high as 
135,000 per square kilometer while in Alexandria it reached 122,000 people per square meter (CAPMAS, 2007). Third, 
the pattern of informal housing also sustained its normality of intensive proliferation: Greater Cairo Region 
comprised 81 informal squatters, most of them have grown on agro-land, and few on desert land in 2006. 
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Additionally, an estimated one million people continued to live in the mausoleums of the historical city's cemetery of 
Cairo. 
Generally, indicators point to the sustainability of the high primacy index and primacy ratio which demonstrate a 
long lasting and consistent high rate of urban growth in primacies, in spite of some evidence of population 
relocation associated with the state's policy trend. Population density and concentration variations between core 
regions, secondary agglomerations, rural areas, and desert still point to a severe distortion pattern of population 
dispersal. 
Another policy assessment method is the comparison with the theoretically established models of public 
development. Assumedly, intersections and consistencies with the theoretical models draw a notion for the policy 
effectiveness and chances of policy success. For the sake of simplification, a comparison with the Event-Based 
Model, postulated by Gore & Nicholson (1985), is used to compare with the Egyptian developmental policy 
paradigm taking Toshki project as an example. Areas used for comparison are the development paradigm's 
feasibility and compatibility, the physical condition of the location of the development, the public procedures 
and decision making mechanism and nature, and the characteristics of ownership. These areas supposedly cover major 
aspects of the development model as described by Gore and Nicholson. 
Feasibility 
There is little evidence of proven feasibility and viability in meeting monetary and non monetary objectives that 
could be referred to as a lack of knowledge, consciously or unconsciously, of some facts associated with 
development projects. Also, there was a failure to approach and test feasibility and viability in any way and through 
any stage of the development process. It is obvious that development decisions, which are fundamentally 
interlinked to the conclusion of whether expected revenues are likely to exceed expected costs enough to produce 
the desired profit, have not followed this course of action. None of the multiple methods of feasibility assessment, 
such as Multi Criteria Assessment (MCA) or the rigid Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) have been used to aid the 
process of making development decisions; accordingly, expected revenues depended on "wishes" more than 
concrete calculus. On the other hand, the expensive bills of development projects, along with the huge investments 
in primacies, continue to seize a major portion of the state's annual budget devoted to investment in infrastructure, 
social services, and urban projects for the whole country. 
Macro economy -public development compatibility 
The fact that spatial equilibrium is the end result of the multitude of interactions between the macroeconomic 
policy and the adopted spatial development policy, policy regime (where macroeconomic policy and urban 
development policy are only elements in the set of government policies), and the structure and capacity of 
institutions raise complications in evaluating the actual consistency of the development paradigm with the state 
macroeconomic framework. At one extreme, there is the possibility that an inconsistent or incompatible 
development policy, rather than weakness in institutional capacity, is mainly responsible for macroeconomic 
crises. At the other extreme, a properly designed development policy can be seriously undermined by a weak and 
ineffectual economic policy and both components tend to be mutually reinforcing. 
One avenue of consistency is to approach development, in terms of selecting policy tools, options, and 
methods of implementation that are related to cost in a way that doesn't disrupt the state's economic plans 
and its capability to achieve economic objectives, in another term, adopt development policy that coincides 
with trends and capacity of the macroeconomic framework. To examine this notion, first, a revision of the 
situation with regards to the macro-economic trends and indicators for the last 10 years in Egypt is undertaken 
hereafter. 
In Fiscal Year 1988, the total revenues of the government were EGP 89.1 billion and reached almost 
EGP184.7bn in FY2008. Much of the increase came from a rise in tax revenues, particularly personal income and 
corporate taxes which constituted the bulk of total domestic taxes due to recent tax reforms. Revenues, however, have 
remained more or less constant (about 21%) as a percentage of the GDP over the past few years. On the expenditure side, 
strong expenditure growth has remained a main feature of the budget. Importantly, there has been a dramatic increase in 
domestic debt which is projected to be roughly 62% of GDP in FY 2002 up from 58.4% in FY 1988, including the 
cost of food and energy subsidies, which rose from EGP18.0 billion in FY2002 to EGP64.5 billion in FY2008. 
The overall deficit, after adjusting for net acquisition of financial assets, remains almost unchanged from the cash deficit. 
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The budget's overall deficit of EGP 43.8 billion or -10.2% of GDP for FY 1998 has become 49.2 billion in FY2007, 
so that is narrowed to -6.7% of GDP. The deficit is financed largely by domestic borrowing and revenue from privatization 
sales, which became a standard accounting practice in the Egyptian budget. More recently, the fiscal conduct 
of the government was under strong criticism and the subject of heated debate and discussions in the Egyptian 
Parliament. In particular, reference was made to weak governance and management, especially for extra 
expensive development projects (Abou Tartour and Toshki in particular), loose implementation of tax 
collection procedures and penalties for offenders, and improper accounting of the overall system of basic 
subsidies and domestic debt, leading to domestic market disruptions, high inflation, increased inefficiencies 
and waste in the domestic economy. 
The gross external debt of Egypt, including the total public and private debt owed to non-residents repayable 
in foreign currency, goods, or services —based on the Ministry of Finance, the Central Bank of Egypt and 
The World Factbook—is estimated at US$29,898 million at the end of FY 2007 (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Egypt's Summary of External Debt 2001-2007 (Millions of USD and Fiscal years). 
Item 2001           2002           2003           2004           2005           2006           2007 
External Debt 
((USD m)                        
18,613        17,488       25,925       26,812       28,949       29,593        29,898 
 
External Debt 
(% GDP)                         
23.3%        20.8%        38.2%        33.9%        30.9%        27.4%        22.9% 
The project's primarily economic studies have recognized that such macroeconomic characteristics, as indicators 
for the state economic capacity to undertake development projects, do not coincide with the high cost of the Tushki 
project. It was noted also in the case of project implementation, that financing project would delay other 
development plans and produce hardships in financing the project's multiple phases. To overcome the lack of 
funds, the state government had sought various sources of funding. While the small short-term finance needed 
during primary works and mobilization was easily secured through internal resources, extensive long- term finance 
needed further capital from external sources. To induce capital pooling, the government introduced attractive tax 
exemptions among packages of other incentive privileges for foreign investors and international contributors, but 
failed to secure the sufficient capital needed. Lack of adequate finance has resulted in a failure to secure constant 
construction progress. Projects completed for the available limited funds from the state's resources thus depended 
on inclusion within the state's capital program, of which spending priorities have been determined not by a market-
led approach to viability but by political assessments of need. As the construction of projects developed, it was 
clear that the market had moved into deep recession, of which Egypt's nascent economy would need extended time 
to recover (Abdelsalam, 2002). 
Ownership 
Designating state owned isolated deserts or wetlands for development has secured land tenures with neither 
ownership costs, disputes with absentee owners, passive ownerships, nor compulsory purchasing actions. 
However, the integrity of the project ownerships was always questioned. The desert farm lands were restricted to 
a limited group of elites who were selected very carefully from the inner circle of the ruling party. Properties were 
later sold at cut rate prices but with a stipulation of purchasing large land lots. While securing legal ownership has 
contributed to attracting few big-capital companies and individual rich investors, the minimum land area conditions 
have excluded the medium and low income population-originally targeted by the development model- from the 
project's land market. The sense of insecurity and instability has, therefore, dominated all job seekers and potential 
land owners who have looked for jobs in the project. For this reasons all of them thought of their jobs as 
"temporary" and eventually they went back to their original home regions or migrated afterward to Cairo or 
Alexandria. 
Institutional capacity and public procedures 
The importance of consistency of both aspects which constitute the policy regime -namely policy design and policy 
implementation- is central to policy success. While technical capacity is critical in devising a compatible set of 
policies, institutional coordination and credibility are pivotal in policy implementation. There are several factors 
which establish the notion of a sound institutional capacity for the conduct of development policies. First, the 
"triumvirate" institutions responsible for development policy, the public, the decision-takers, and planning bodies 
(and their associated think tanks) should exist, have clear mandates, and perform respective functions properly. 
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These functions encompass all the processes involved in the formulation and implementation of developmental 
policies. Second, policy coordination among the triumvirate institutions, as well as with other government agencies 
responsible for sectoral policies, is important. This is because there is a need to ensure that cross-policy consistency 
is maintained and various policy conflicts are avoided, or at least minimized, in both the short and long term. Third, 
the status and credibility of those institutions (and that of the government bureaucracy in general), particularly in 
terms of their relative autonomy from political interference, are significant in that their capacity to provide 
professional policy analysis and options for "rational" decision-making should be maximized. The ultimate 
decision making authority rests, of course, with the legitimate political institutions in a country. Last but not least, 
fundamental market institutions such as property rights and contract enforcement must exist and function. In the 
absence or malfunctioning of these enabling conditions, no development policy can perform properly, as the policy 
transmission mechanisms which are intended to create a certain structure of incentives are blocked or perverted. 
Institutional constraints to formulating and implementing development policies can be interpreted as the absence 
or relative malfunctioning of any of the abovementioned factors. 
Since the state government (the decision-maker) is the only actor in the development process, Toshki 
would never have been carried out if it had not obtained strong presidential adoption and support which indicates, 
as previously mentioned, a drastic political interference in the development decisions. While the law stipulates the 
Parliament's approval of the national projects, and in contrary to the strong opposition by planning experts and 
community groups, development endorsement did not represent a problem with the manipulation by the ruling 
party of the parliament which, by all means, represents a complete absence of public participation in decision making. 
Approvals for development, public procedures, and legal actions are performed by the Cabinet's different bodies 
upon the approval. According to the political nature of each development project and the power of the 
presidential support, legal requirements can be easily waived to let the project proceed or bring the project to a complete 
halt. 
Physical conditions 
One of the most controversial issues in Toshki is the suitability of the site's physical conditions for the nature and 
feasibility of such development activity. Site surveys which were undertaken to record ground levels, investigate 
soil structure, and check for the location suitability for agriculture indicated hardships in providing irrigation water 
to the site without the reconstruction of expensive pump stations and of open concrete irrigation channels. There 
were also restrictions preventing the construction of foul or surface water sewers which needed further 
arrangements and additional cost. The state government advocated the expected high cost that resulted from the 
physical conditions of the selected site based on the idea that a distinction should be drawn between the existence 
and the impact of physical constraints, and on the notion that physical constraints do not necessarily prevent 
development- as they can normally be expressed in terms of extra preparation or construction costs- which may be 
eligible for a derelict land grant or other public subsidy. Furthermore, the acuteness of the population polarization 
trend, in addition to the gap of agricultural food production- consumption was politically used to garner some social 
acceptance for the project's physical hardships. Delays due to severe hot temperatures, regular sand storms, and 
unexpected soil structure have resulted in additional costs in terms of lost revenues and interest charges on working 
capital. 
Another physical aspect of the development model is the distance between the project location and the 
inhabited regions with their centers of concentration of activity. While a smaller distance exists between the 
origin -lower upper Egypt- and the destination -Toushki-than the distance between the origin and preferred 
migration destination as Cairo-and Alexandria, which suggests stronger attraction forces according to the Zipf s 
Gravity model, other destination's interrelated conditions intervened negatively to weaken the expected 
attraction forces. These conditions can be classified into three major factor groups: economic, socio-political, 
and physical. Economic factors are: a) weak access to employment opportunities in comparison to Cairo and 
Alexandria, b) high cost of living, c) expensive transportation and communications, and d) the non equivalent salaries 
all representing weak economic pulling forces. While socio-political pulling forces are generated by a) lower 
standards of social services and amenities provided in the project and areas existed in the alternative destinations, 
b) the exclusion of middle and low income group from formal project's land market, and c) lack of public 
support for the project. The physical pulling forces are embedded in the unbearable harsh environment™1, and 
hardships in travelling and commuting to the project are due to poor and insufficient transportation measures. 
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A POSSIBLE WAY OUT? 
Development policy that focuses on developing clusters of activities and adopts modern technology in newly 
reclaimed desert or desolated hinterlands, but turns a blind eye to the lagging traditional agriculture and industrial 
sectors in the Nile Delta and valley, creates a two-sided context of the development of the economy. As these 
subsets never integrate, they act as an impediment to the national development matrix. In this case, economic 
disparity and poverty are likely to intensify, especially for those who live in rural areas and who are engaged in 
lagging economic sectors. Highly paid economic activities concentrated in proximity to urban cores and which 
depend on highly skilled labor and modern technology are far from harmonized with low-paid, intensive, unskilled 
labor-based activities especially in agriculture sector. This inconsistency maintains the structure of migratory 
pulling-pushing forces intact. Therefore, allocating investments to produce homogeneous economic subsets 
remains crucial. 
It is already known that a viable tool to activate polarization reversal is to control migratory pulling and 
pushing forces operating in the spatial setting, but to do so, regional and interregional expansionary forces should 
be initially operated through an interregional inter-industry/agriculture linkage system which secures harmonization 
of the incompatible economic subsets. While the study reveals the state government recognition for the need to initiate 
the process of polarization reversal, it also reveals that the recently adopted policy option- as much as the 
previous ones- does not influence the migratory pulling and pushing forces. The inexistence of signs of policy 
reappraisal and readjustment suggests a lack of formal political commitment to development and probably 
reveals the need for a different spatial policy approach. 
Such a new policy approach aims primarily to evenly and gradually balance spatial pattern and population 
through "actual" investment in secondary urban centers. These centers, which are designated to accommodate 
more population and urban growth and simultaneously sustain their original residents, can play a central role for 
economic development if they are permitted to. The development approach focuses on constructing a micro-
economic development environment in secondary urban centers by promoting self employment projects and 
micro-entrepreneurial industries, accessible micro- loans and lending mechanisms, and improved communication 
and transportation networks and amenities that support this pattern. This, probably, can lessen the intensity 
of over-urbanization in urban cores without compromising the accomplished rate of economic development. The 
equilibrium of spatial redistribution and balanced population dispersal permits a grace period from the pressure and 
associated problems of over urbanization before exhausting the carrying capacity of the secondary and lower-rank 
urban centers. During such a grace period, it is expected that some of the pressure on urban management institutions is 
alleviated and consequently allow for better regional management and spatial integration. Promotion of the spatial 
integration may be extensively targeted through the development of efficient regional connectedness tools such as 
better and reduced transportation costs that may reduce the total cost of producing and delivering regional 
products to market, labor, and other production-cost differentials. Having generated these alternative opportunities, 
the intensity and direction of migratory forces would be reconstructed. 
As secondary agglomerations are expected to operate as polycentric nodes for development, they can 
secure outward expansion on proximate development locations with compatible and coherent economic bases. 
Economic growth would secure finance for reasonably inexpensive infrastructure and help in the establishment 
of new markets and demands for commodities. The wealth creating alternative economic opportunities generated would 
provide a solid base for population stable growth. 
Considering the macro level of the economy, cost of resources is considerably lower in those secondary 
agglomerations than in the newly constructed development locations. Investment in secondary 
agglomerations in terms of manpower development and new technology employment is often cost effective 
and has a better cost recovery as there is neither the need to establish basic infrastructure nor invest in mobilizing the 
population. 
As for the social level, such a policy approach would decrease the wide social gap that exists among 
community groups living in primacies and in other lower-rank cities and rural areas. Upgrading living standards for 
the underprivileged population would probably enhance population equity and ease escalating social unrest. 
Spreading these policies over a longer span of time would increase the chances of overcoming the negative 
implications of the policy on the national rate of development. This approach is assumed to be more tolerated 
by Egypt's nascent economy and has a direct and faster effect on Egyptians' livelihood. 
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CONCLUSION 
The answer to the question posed on the front pages of this discourse is no, the current development policy in 
Egypt doesn't pay-off in managing the deformation of the spatial system. Analysis of statistical census results of 
years 1986, 1996, and 2006 reveals the constancy of the population indicators, migration trends, and urban growth 
patterns which represent major distortions of the spatial system. This unchangeable situation suggests the 
incapacity of the spatial development policy to manipulate the current spatial system and trends, specifically the 
initiation of the polarization-reversal process. 
Historical natural factors have been adversely working against constructing a healthily balanced and regionally 
integrated spatial system in Egypt; the geography of the river Nile and the hot, arid climate nature of Egypt. 
Along with natural factors comes a group of political-economic dimensions contributing to the same end result; the 
state's biased pattern of urban development investments, the political atmosphere and ruling regime's lack of 
commitment towards development, and the state incapacity to manage and maintain development. 
Since the current development policy has had an insignificant effect on the urban setting, unfavorable 
system characteristics are likely not only to continue but also to intensify. These are resulting in a more regional 
disparity which leads, in turn, to regional diseconomy and disintegration. 
Comparing Egypt's development policy paradigm to the theoretically established Event-Based Public 
Development model indicates general inconsistency except for in the minor area of compatibility. Development 
policy inefficiency is revealed in the identification of notoriously infeasible goals, and in the lack of mechanism of 
reassessment and feedback, internal consistency, logical soundness, transparency, and consistency with the 
national economic objectives and plans. This suggests the inevitability to resort to another less ambitious 
policy trend that focuses on a priority of developing lagging regions already equipped with basic infrastructure 
and human resources. This "grace-period" policy approach depends on effective alteration for the migratory pulling and 
pushing structure to achieve a period of grace that enables the institutional structure to reform and carry out 
development responsibilities. However, this alternative approach has no chance of success unless it is accompanied 
by formal commitment to development. 
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i At that time Alexandria was house of cotton stock exchange and setting of western and local wealthy 
merchants. 
ii Cairo's population represents 26.2 % of the total urban population (Human Development Report, 
UNDP 
Egypt, 2006). 
iii According to the World Bank Country Classification, Egypt has been promoted from the low 
income categoiy to lower middle income category. 
iv Disvisions are: Governorate, capital city of Governorale, towns, Marakez (small towns), Ahyaa 
(plural of hai) defined according to local administration law initiated 1996. 
v Geographically, Egypt is divided into three major administrative units, 86 Hai,( Kism), 196 Markaz, 
and 187 city. (Egypt Human Development Report (EHDR). 2008). 
vi Toshki project, the utmost of a kind, aims at the reclamation of 500 000 feddans vi of desert land 
in the first phase to be increased to 630 000 feddans in the second phase all irrigated by surfaced 
water. The project master plan includes the establishment of 18 small towns and 100 villages in 
addition to multiple agricultural-based industrial projects. A total of 345000 employment 
opportunity were estimated to be secured and the total investment averaged 300 billion Egyptian 
pounds (60 billion USD) (Alahram 2008). The agricultural nature of the project was met by 
acceptance as it was seen a viable tool for alleviating the escalating pressure of agricultural food 
shortage. 
™ Summer noon temperature may reach 50 degrees centigrade in shade. 
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